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MACHINERY OF EMPIRE
Abstract: This study examines the historical usage of accounting as a
technology of government within the domain of government-indigenous peoples relations in Canada. Our thesis is that accounting was
salient within the chain of circumstances that influenced the discovery/identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population.
By the 1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central
place in the military machinery of empire. When the cost-cutting
and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the early 1800s
encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used in the attempt to
interrogate military expenditures. Partially as a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be identified as a site for cost
cutting by British bureaucrats. However, it was at the level of the
colonial administration in the Upper and Lower Canadas that the
c o m p e t i n g d e m a n d s of " g o v e r n m e n t " e n c o u r a g e d i n d i g e n o u s
peoples to be viewed as a potential site for government. And it was
once this "discovery" was made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the attempt to t u r n indigenous peoples into a
governable population. This study contributes to our understanding
of accounting by documenting the ways in which techniques such as
accounting were central to the military machinery of empire and
British imperialism. The study also contributes to our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape current-day usages of
accounting as a technology of government within the domain of
government-First Nations relations.
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The sun never sets on the British Empire [source unknown].
INTRODUCTION
The "discoveries" of America by Columbus in 1492, the
province of Newfoundland by Cabot in 1497, and the province
of Quebec by Carrier in 1534 [Wright, 1993, p. 122] marked the
beginning of 250 years of struggle between the imperial powers
of France and Britain for control of the territory we now call
Canada and its inhabitants. Both France and Britain courted
the indigenous peoples as important military allies in the periodic skirmishes that occurred. When the British Empire ultimately prevailed over France in 1760, it subsequently issued a
Royal Proclamation in 1763 recognizing the rights of aboriginal
peoples to unceded lands and stating that the negotiations between Britain and aboriginal peoples would be on a nation-tonation basis [Royal Proclamation, 1763]. In the subsequent war
of independence with the United States, aboriginal peoples
were encouraged to side with Britain in return for parcels of
land in Upper Canada [Report on the Affairs of Indians in
Canada, 1847, S3, p. 5.1]. l
In the 250 years since this Royal Proclamation, relations
between the remnants of the British Empire and First Nations
peoples have certainly changed. Nation-to-nation relations have
been replaced by paternal relations in which the government of
Canada has attempted , through coercive tutelage [Dyck, 1997],
to "govern" [Foucault, 1991] the affairs of First N a t i o n s
peoples. The recent Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
[1996], for example, documented the ways in which the Canadian government has attempted to assimilate and otherwise
manage the affairs of indigenous peoples [see particularly Volu m e 1, Chapters 8-10]. Through the bureaucratic mechanisms
of the Department of Indian Affairs and the supporting "Indian
Act," the state has attempted to exercise action at a distance
over First Nations peoples. Within these attempts at governance, accounting techniques such as funding and taxation relations have been used to encourage/discourage certain behaviors
[see also Reform Party, 1997].
In certain ways these shifts in relations parallel more general shifts in the "art of government." Miller and Rose [1990, p.
2] commented that the modern state has come to rely on tech-

1

We subsequently refer to this Report as RAIC with Sections I and II being
published
in 1844 and Section III in 1847.
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nologies of government to align economic, political, and social
objectives. Through "apparently humble and m u n d a n e mechanisms" such as "techniques of notation, computation and calculation," along with professional expertises [Miller and Rose,
1990, p. 8], government is exercised in the attempt to enable
action at a distance — to incite, induce, and seduce populations
to behave in certain ways [Foucault, 1984, p. 171]. Since the
19th century, these techniques of rule have supplemented and
mostly supplanted more direct forms of sovereign power in
core countries [Foucault, 1991, p. 102]. However, as Fanon
[1963] stated, within the colonial context force continues to
form the backdrop for more subtle forms of governance.
If, as we suggest, Canada's indigenous population has come
to be viewed by the state as a population to be "governed," how
did the slippage from a nation-to-nation relationship to a paternal relationship occur and how did First Nations peoples come
to be targeted as a site for government? Furthermore, when
were accounting techniques introduced as a technology of government? In answering these questions, this study suggests that
the following circumstances contributed to the "discovery" of
indigenous peoples as a population to be governed. By the
1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central
place in the military machinery of empire. When the cost-cutting and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the
early 1800s encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs
of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used
in the attempt to interrogate military expenditures. Partially as
a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be
identified as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats. However, it was at the level of the colonial administration in the
Upper and Lower Canadas that the competing d e m a n d s of
"government" encouraged indigenous peoples to be viewed as a
potential site for government. 2 It was once this "discovery" was
made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the
attempt to turn indigenous peoples into a governable population.
This study contributes to our understanding of accounting
in two ways. First, the study documents the ways in which
techniques such as accounting were central to the military ma2

Throughout this study we use the term Canadas as a short-form for the
Maritimes, Upper Canada, and Lower Canada. Although similarities undoubtedly exist with the m a n n e r in which indigenous peoples were treated in the
western territories,
analysis focuses on the aforementioned three regions.
Published
by eGrove,our
1999
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chinery of empire. Authors such as Headrick [1981] have argued that the "hardware of imperialism"— technical innovations such as the Gatling gun, the steamboat, quinine, etc. —
contributed to the success of European imperialism. More recently it has been recognized that the "software of imperialism"
— professional expertises such as geography, accounting, etc.
— also played a role in imperialism [Said, 1993; Bell et al.,
1995; Neu, 1997]. The current study contributes to this line of
inquiry by documenting the intertwining of accounting within
the military machinery of empire.
Second, the study locates the m o m e n t a n d m a n n e r in
w h i c h accounting techniques first c a m e to be focused o n
Canada's indigenous population. Within the domain of presentday, government-First Nations relations, government policy appears to be directed at encouraging action at a distance. But
how did accounting techniques come to penetrate this domain?
The analysis provided seeks to "identify the accidents, the
minute deviations. . . . that gave birth to those things that continue to exist" [Foucault, 1984, p. 81]. This study contributes to
our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape current-day usages of accounting as a technology of government.
In doing so, the study illustrates the persistence of accounting
as a technology of government within the domain of government-First Nations relations.
GOVERNING THE EMPIRE
Imperialism means thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that is distant,
that is lived on and owned by others [Said, 1993, p. 5].
By all accounts, the 19th century was the age of the British
E m p i r e [cf H o b s o n , 1902; H e a d r i c k , 1 9 8 1 ; D a v i s a n d
Huttenback, 1986]. The amount of territory controlled by Britain and the population under its tutelage increased sevenfold
and twentyfold respectively:
The British Empire alone, already formidable in 1800
with a land area of 1.5 million square miles and a
population of twenty million, increased its land area
sevenfold and its population twentyfold in the following hundred years [Headrick, 1981, p. 3].
Although other European imperial powers were also expanding
during this time period, between 1800 and 1914 the a m o u n t of
the world's land surface controlled by Europeans increased
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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from 35 percent to 84 percent [Headrick, 1981, p. 3]. Britain
was perhaps the most successful [Barclay, 1976, p. 1].
In a t t e m p t i n g to explain the success of i m p e r i a l i s m ,
Headrick [1981, p. 9] suggested that imperialism occurred
when both adequate motives and means were present for imperial expansion. Economic motives were assumed to be adequate
motives for the expansion of the British Empire [Hobson, 1902,
p. 59]; business interests at least benefitted from imperial expansion even if the British taxpayer ended up absorbing the
costs of empire [Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 317]. Adequate
means referred to the existence of technologies that supported
imperial expansion and control [Headrick, 1981, 1988].
Headrick [1981] argued that the adoption of new technologies for military purposes provided the means for imperial expansion. For example, the development of steam gunboats
aided in the colonization of India [pp. 17-42]; the identification
of quinine as a protection against malaria along with steam
gunboats assisted in the colonization of Africa [p. 73]; and the
development of breech-loading and repeat-firing guns throughout the colonies allowed for the subjugation of indigenous
peoples [p. 115]. Additionally, technologies such as steamships,
railways, and communication cables furthered both military
and economic purposes. These technologies have been referred
to as the "hardware of imperialism" [Bell et al., 1995].
Parallelling the development of such hardware was the development of "softer" expertises and disciplines, what Bell et al.
[1995, p. 2] referred to as the software of imperialism. Disciplinary knowledges such as geography, medicine, and accounting helped imperial powers come to "know" the territories and
inhabitants under their control [Said, 1979, p. 84; Bell et al.,
1995, p. 4]. These techniques sorted, sifted, and classified, allowing knowledges of "distant places...to be mobilized [and]
brought home to centres of calculation in the form of maps,
drawings, readings" [Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 9].
Miller and Rose [1990, p. 8] used the phrase "technologies
of government" to denote the roles played by softer and indirect
techniques such as accounting in the act of governing at "home
and abroad:"
We use the term technologies to suggest a particular
approach to the analysis of the activity of ruling, one
which pays great attention to the actual mechanisms
through which authorities of various sorts have sought
to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct,
Published by eGrove, 1999
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thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to
achieve the objectives they consider desirable.
Miller and Rose [1990, p. 16] specifically mentioned techniques
of accounting (i.e.; techniques of notation, computation, and
calculation) and discussed the implementation of discounted
cash flow analysis in Britain. Although the focus of Miller and
Rose's [1990, p. 9] analysis was on the usage of technologies of
government within imperial centers, they acknowledged the
roles played by these technologies in the colonies. Likewise,
Said [1979, p. 40] discussed the role of softer technologies
within the processes of colonization, and Neu [1997] examined
how accounting techniques in colonial Canada were used to
control and contain indigenous peoples. These studies hinted at
the ways in which technologies of government were intertwined
with the hardware of imperialism. The current study builds on
these insights in examining the intertwining of accounting with
the military apparatuses of empire. 3
MILITARY MACHINERY AND ACCOUNTING CALCULATION
Following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s, economic retrenchment became the principal objective of British
government in the attempt to reduce the national debt [Spiers,
1980, p. 74]. Not surprisingly, the military became a primary
target for such reduction given that military expenditures were
the main items of public expenditure. "Expenditure on the
a r m y a n d o r d n a n c e fell f r o m 4 3 , 2 5 6 , 2 6 0 £ in 1815 t o
10,699,865£ in 1820; thereafter it slipped below 10£ million,
plummeting to just under 8£ million in 1836" [Spiers, 1980, p.
74]. Coinciding with this crisis of expenditure was an increase
in anti-military sentiment at home and the emergence of a
strong reform sentiment [Sweetman, 1984, pp. 15,17]. Together
these sentiments encouraged a "deluge of official action," including bills and the formation of select committees to examine
various aspects of public policy and government administration.
Colonial military operations were neither spared from
these reform and cost-saving sentiments nor from official government actions. On February 18, 1834, the British House of
Commons ordered "that a select Committee be appointed to
3
We treat the notion of governmentality and technologies of government
as a "field of investigation" (Miller and Rose, 1995) and theorize these techniques within the broader notion(s) of imperialism/colonialism.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5

6

Neu: Discovering indigenous peoples: Accounting and the machinery of empire
Neu: Discovering Indigenous Peoples

59

inquire into the Military Establishment and Expenditure in the
Colonies and Dependencies of The Crown" [Report, 1834, Vol.
1, p. 1]. The Committee gathered evidence, interviewed witnesses, and presented the first volume of its report to the House
of Commons in August 1834. The second volume was completed and presented to the House of Commons in 1835. In
these reports, the Committee examined military establishments
and expenditures in the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian
Islands, the Western Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope,
and the Island of Ceylon [in Vol. 1] and New South Wales, Van
Diemen's Land, and the North American Provinces [in Vol. 2].
The published report of the Select Committee contains the Select Committee's analysis and recommendations along with
minutes of evidence from witnesses and supplementary appendices. 4
The Report is an exceptional document produced at a specific juncture in time, partially in response to the demands for
administrative reform and increased economy in the military.
More specifically, the Report illustrates how, at least at this
m o m e n t in time, the military machinery of empire relied on
techniques such as accounting. In his examination of the administration of the British military during this time period,
Sweetman [1984, p. 3] made a similar point when he commented that the "development of improved techniques of accounting . . . created the impetus for efficiency which reflected
throughout the [military] administrative system."
The m a n d a t e of the Select Committee and the Reports
themselves illustrate this intertwining of the hardware and software of empire. The mandate of the Select Committee was to
inquire into both the adequacy of military establishments and
the cost of these establishments. Throughout the minutes of
evidence, witnesses were repeatedly asked to juxtapose and balance these two goals. And in the final Report, the first two
recommendations explicitly dealt with the adequacy of force
and the cost of maintaining this force:
Resolved, That it is not the Intention of this Committee
. . . to relieve the Executive Government from the Duty
which constitutionally belongs to it, of providing . . . A

4
In subsequent discussions we refer to the published output of the Select
Committee as "The Report," which consists of the Select Committee's analysis
and recommendations, along with the minutes of evidence and supplementary
appendices.
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force sufficient for the Security of His Majesty's Possessions abroad [Report, Vol. 1., p. iii, emphases added].
and:
Resolved, That the Committee are of the Opinion, That
the strictest Economy should be observed in every
branch of Military Expenditure of the Colonies; and
that any surplus Revenue that may remain after defraying their Civil Expenses. . . be applied to the payment
of their Military Charges [Report, Vol. 1, p. iii, emphases added].
Thus, the mandate of the Select Committee and the final Report
itself set up as mutual goals the maintenance of effective and
efficient military force in the colonies [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 26,
44].
It was these notions of efficiency and economy so prevalent
in reformist discourses at this time [cf. Sweetman, 1984, p. 13]
which provided the rhetorical space for accounting techniques.
In attempting to assess the economy of military operations in
distant places, the Committee turned not only to eyewitnesses
b u t to accounting techniques and records. Consistent with the
comments of Miller and Rose [1990, p. 8], [ a c c o u n t i n g records
provided the Select Committee with a short-form representation of distant events. By providing this information to decision
makers in the imperial center, accounting helped to render
these distant locales "governable."
Throughout the Report is the recognition that accounting
is a "useful" technology with regards to governing military operations. The Report contains an extended discussion of the
accounting records for individual detachments and whether
these records provide appropriate information [Report, Vol. 2,
pp. 63-64, 83]. In keeping with the emphasis on economy, questions posed by the lawyer for the Select Committee to a bureaucrat from the military asked whether accounting methods promoted economy:
Q.

If those two are able to keep the accounts in the
whole of Newfoundland for 276 rank and file, how
is it that so large a staff is kept in those parts of
Canada where detachments from only 10 to 50
men exist?

A.

. . . The same description of accounts are necessary for a detachment of 50 men as are necessary
for a regiment of 800, provided the regiment of

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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800 is at one post; but if the regiment is scattered
over different p a r t s of the country, t h e n t h a t
would impose additional labour upon the commissariat, because each detachment would require the
same description of accounts to be rendered in
duplicate, and the same description of vouchers
[Report, Vol. 2, p. 63].
The notion of economy also motivated discussions regarding
the prevention of fraud [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 57, 73] and discussions regarding how often the accounts of different detachments/regiments/commissariats were audited and by w h o m [p.
65]. From these examples, it appears that accounting techniques were viewed as an integral tool in the government of
military operations.
The Report itself not only discussed accounting techniques
but used accounting numbers. [Accounting data were interspersed throughout the Report, usually with the effect of making visible certain aspects of military operations. For example,
included in the appendices were tables listing the cost to Britain of military operations in different colonies.

Published by eGrove, 1999
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FIGURE 1
AN ACCOUNT of the AMOUNT paid by Great

Britain

for the MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Source: Appendix to Report from Select Committee on Military Expenditure
[1835]

Other tables enumerated the n u m b e r and distribution of effective forces, including a breakdown of officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers in Canada [Report, Vol. 2, p. 96],
whereas yet other tables summarized the "pay, allowances,
emoluments, advantages and salaries" accruing to different
military personnel in different locations [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 9095].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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This cost information was then referred to in the questioning of
witnesses regarding the appropriate military force at a particular location.
In these ways, accounting information represented to the
Select Committee the state of affairs in the colonies and thereby
provided a starting point for examining issues of military
economy. This information also created the illusion that it was
possible to compare the military efficiency of disparate locales.
For example, a recurrent theme in the questioning of military
officials by the Select Committee was the differential cost of
military personnel in Nova Scotia vis-a-vis the rest of Canada:
It appears by the Returns that the n u m b e r of troops in
Nova Scotia and in Canada are nearly equal; that there
is not a difference of above 200 between the a m o u n t of
troops in Canada and Nova Scotia: be kind enough to
explain to the Committee why there is such a difference between the amount of the expense of the commissariat at Canada and Nova Scotia; and state why it
should be three times the a m o u n t at the one place as it
is at the other, for nearly the same n u m b e r of troops
[Report, Vol. 2, p. 55]?
Although the locales under consideration were quite different,
the Committee kept returning to the issue of cost differences,
asking the witnesses to explain why two jurisdictions in the
same general geographic area [i.e., North America] had such
different costs [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 53, 55, 72]. This reliance
on accounting data to compare locations is not surprising
since, as Miller and Rose [1990, p. 7] commented, programs of
government depend on apparently "stable, mobile, combinable
and comparable" data because such data render the domain
under consideration "susceptible to evaluation, calculation and
intervention."
Accounting information not only provided a starting point
for comparing the military efficiency of different locales as represented in n u m b e r s but also for interrogating the military
judgments of the expert witnesses. For example, cost data pertaining to the governor of Newfoundland's ship provided the
starting point for the following line of questioning directed at
the former governor of Newfoundland:
Is there not a vessel or yacht for the governor's use at
Newfoundland? Yes, there is . . . What is the a m o u n t of
expense? The contract for the vessel is 2,300£ a year
[pp. 32-33] . . . do you consider it absolutely necessary
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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that a yacht should be kept up, or so large a vessel as at
present? I think that it is quite necessary that the vessel
should be kept up. The size at present is not more than
adequate for the purpose for which she is wanted. She
is not wanted exclusively for the governor's use; she is
r e q u i r e d w h e n n e c e s s a r y to send d e t a c h m e n t s of
troops to different parts of the islands, and she should
be able to carry them...and she has been sent to cruize
when complaints have been made of the conduct of the
French with respect to the fishery and to prevent smuggling and other duties [p. 40].
In this example, accounting data made visible certain aspects of
military operations in the Canadian colony. Select Committee
members focused their questions on these aspects, asking the
military witnesses to justify in military terms the appropriateness of these expenditures.
In another instance, accounting data were used to frame
the decision as to whether "regular forces" or the militia should
be used to defend Canada. These kinds of questions were directed toward a lieutenant colonel stationed in Nova Scotia:
Q.

Is the militia force a popular force in Nova Scotia?

A.

I should say it is certainly

Q.

How are the officers and men paid when embodied?

A.

They are paid by a vote of the House of Assembly...

Q.

Is not the pay very inferior to that which they can
obtain by labour or by any work as artisans or
labourers?

A.

The pay is very inferior . . .

Q.

Then taking that into consideration, and taking
into consideration the difficulty of finding employment for emigrants...do you think there would be
any doubt of finding a sufficient n u m b e r of men
for the militia at as low a rate of pay as British
soldiers?

A.

Emigrants without money would e n l i s t . . .

Q.

Supposing the experiment were tried . . . do you,
in a military point of view see any objection to
employing a proportion of that force, and releasing an equivalent proportion of the regular force
of the country?
Published by eGrove, 1999
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A.

If it were possible to have the militia as perfectly
trained as our militia were during the late war, I
should see no objection to a certain portion, but I
doubt that being practicable [Report, Vol. 2, pp.
28-29].

The above line of questioning illustrates the ways in which the
Select Committee forced its military witnesses to justify their
military judgments in terms of cost efficiency. The issue of cost
as constructed through accounting reports continually framed
and set the parameters for military judgments.
As hinted in the above examples, accounting techniques
and data provided a "map" of distant military operations, making visible the military configurations of these distant locales.
The maps formed by apparently stable, combinable, and comparable accounting data [Miller and Rose, 1990, pp. 7, 9]
brought home to the "centers of calculation" information about
colonial m i l i t a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s , t h e r e b y allowing "local"
knowledges to be mobilized by imperial powers [Said, 1979, p.
44]. Accounting numbers helped operationalize the discourse of
economy [cf. Power, 1992, p. 478; Neu and Taylor, 1996, p. 451]
and thereby created a discursive framework in which military
decisions were viewed and ultimately had to be justified. This
same data also provided the Select Committee with a starting
basis for questioning and interrogating the opinions and judgments of military witnesses. By continually juxtaposing the
"truths" as m a d e visible by accounting n u m b e r s with the
"truths" enunciated by military personnel, the Select Committee sought to understand the state of military operations in
these distant colonies.
The foregoing analysis illustrates the ways in which the
military machinery of empire at this juncture relied on accounting techniques. Accounting techniques had penetrated the domain of military operations and appeared to function not only
as the guidance system for the empire's military machinery but
also as a useful technology for interrogating the military costs
during this period of economic retrenchment. In the next sections, we analyze how indigenous peoples came to be viewed as
a site for cost cutting and, subsequently, as a population to be
governed.
A SITE FOR COST CUTTING
Relations between Canada's indigenous peoples and the
British military date back to at least the 1600s. In 1670, Charles
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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II issued a code of instructions to the governors of the Canadian colonies instructing the military to "at no time give any
just provocation to any of the said Indians that are at peace
with us" [RAIC, 1844, p. a.3]. Throughout the subsequent colonial skirmishes, the British military sought to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies in their battles with the French and in
the subsequent War of Independence. Following the capitulation of the French in North America in 1760, Britain formally
recognized the rights of indigenous peoples in the Royal Proclamation of 1763:
And whereas it is just and reasonable and essential to
our interest and the security of our Colonies, that the
several natives or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are
connected, and who live under our protection, should
not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such
part of our dominions and territories, as not having
been ceded to us, are reserved to them, or any of them
as their hunting grounds.
Not only did the Proclamation recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to unceded land, it stated that negotiations between Britain and indigenous peoples would be on a nation-tonation basis [Milloy, 1983].
Even after the defeat of France, the British military continued to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies. The annual distribution of "presents" to indigenous peoples was the primary
method of maintaining this military support:
From the earliest period of the connexion between the
Indians and the British Government it has been customary to distribute annually certain presents, consisting chiefly of clothing and ammunition. . . . The objective at that period was doubtless in the first instance to
conciliate the Indians, to ensure their services, and to
supply their wants as warriors in the field; and afterwards, in times of peace, to secure their allegiance towards the British Crown, and their good will and
peaceful behaviour towards the white settlers [RAIC,
1844, p. 6].
The military connection between indigenous peoples and the
British empire was formally recognized in 1816 with the transfer of jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the Commander of the
Forces. The Indian Department, as it came to be called, was
responsible for the yearly distribution of presents and other
matters pertaining to relations between the military and indigenous peoples:
Published
by eGrove, 1999
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The system of dealing with them was essentially military. For a long time they were under the head of the
military department, and were considered and treated
as military allies or stipendiaries [RAIC, 1844, p. 6]
Therefore, relations between the military and indigenous
peoples were not i m m u n e to the cost-cutting sentiments of the
times. The cost-cutting sentiments prevalent in Britain encouraged the continual whittling away of the budget for the military
[Sweetman, 1984, p. 17] which, in turn, impacted upon military
operations in the Canadian provinces. As early as 1822, the
Colonial Secretary for the Canadian provinces "contemplated a
reduction of the Indian Department, with a view to its ultimate
abolition" [RAIC, 1844, p. 7]. In 1829, the Lords of Treasury
and the Secretary of State issued an order that "the whole expense of the [Indian] Department should not exceed 20,000£."
In 1832, an accounting allocation change was recommended
that the charges for the Indian Department be separated from
other charges relating to colonial operations in Canada when
being presented to Parliament for approval:
Previously to this period the charges for the presents,
including those given on account of the annuities payable for lands surrendered, had been yearly granted by
the British Parliament in a separate vote, while the
salaries and pensions of the officers of the Indian Department had been paid from the military chest. This
course being considered irregular, Lord Goderich proposed that for the future, the land-payments or annuities payable for land surrendered, which were confined to Upper Canada, should be charged on the
Casual or Territorial Revenue of that Province, while
the remaining charge, having been originally incurred
with the view of securing the services of Indians in
wars, for British, and not exclusively colonial interests,
ought, according to His Lordship's view, to be provided
by the Imperial Parliament [RAIC, 1844, p. 8].
This shift in policy, which was implemented in 1834, had the
effect of making visible the costs of maintaining current relations with indigenous peoples. These cost-cutting sentiments
and accounting policy changes would reemerge in the 1835 Select Committee Report, contributing to the Report's ultimate
conclusion that the Indian Department should be abolished.
During the inquiry phase of the Select Committee, the Indian Department was subjected to the same scrutiny as other
military operations. For example, accounting data regarding
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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costs provided the starting point for asking a senior military
official about the functions of the Indian Department vis-a-vis
the commissariat:
Q.

It appears by the Returns that there are 40 m e n at
Penetanguishene, and yet there are two deputy
commissary-generals at an expense of 273£, and
223£; there is an issuer and a labourer at 79£;
making a total of 650£ for the mere commissariat:
how can they be employed?

A.

Penetanguishene is now the great depot in Upper
Canada, from whence presents are issued to the
Indians; but that will not justify, in my opinion,
keeping permanently there so great a commissariat establishment [Report, Vol. 2, p. 52].

The answer to the above question suggested an overlap in the
duties of the two departments. Following up on this suggestion,
the Select Committee asked subsequent expert witnesses (e.g.,
deputy assistant commissary-general located in the Canadas)
questions regarding the micro-details of present distribution
and whether both departments were necessary:
Q:

Have you yourself attended any of those [present]
distributions? . . . At what place? . . . How many
Indians attended? . . . At what months in the year?
. . . What were the articles distributed? . . . Did you
take all those things up with you, or is there any
depot kept there? . . . On your arrival there, what
measures are taken, and how is the distribution
regulated? . . . Do any observations occur to you,
as to a better and cheaper mode of distribution
t h a n that which is now used [pp. 73-74]?

Q:

Can you give us any information as to the distribution of presents, and how far the duties now performed by the commissariat may be performed by
the Indian Department, or the duties of the Indian
Department performed by the commissariat?

A:

I should think the commissariat would be quite
competent to distribute the presents without any
Indian Department, which is quite an expensive
machine [p. 77].

and:

As the above questions illustrate, once the Indian Department
had been identified as a potential site for cost cutting, subsequent by
questions
honed in on the actual duties performed by the
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department and the overlap with duties performed by the commissariat.
Given the parameters of the Select Committee's m a n d a t e
and the direction of the questions, the Report's final conclusion
regarding the Indian Department is not surprising:
Resolved: That the Committee are of the opinion from
the Evidence taken, and to which they refer, that the
Indian Department may be greatly reduced, if not entirely abolished, a n d they therefore call attention of the
House to the same; and also to the expenses of articles
annually distributed to the Indians, and whether any
arrangement may not be made to dispense with such
distribution in future, or to commute the presents for
money [Report, Vol. 2, p. iii].
The evidence indicated that the military support provided by
indigenous peoples was less needed in the 1830s t h a n in earlier
periods. This diminished need, coupled with the discourse of
economy and the emphasis throughout the Committee's process
on cost cutting, made the final recommendation that the Indian
Department be abolished quite predictable.
The preceding analysis proposes that concerns regarding
the costs of maintaining Britain's empire indirectly contributed
to the identification of indigenous peoples in the Canadas as a
site for cost cutting. Specifically, it was the interrogation of
military costs in the colonies by the Select Committee that
made visible the costs of the Indian Department. However, it is
important to note that the identification of the Indian Department as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats is not
synonymous with indigenous peoples coming to be identified as
a site for governance, notwithstanding that it contributed. As
the next section proposes, it was colonial administrators with
responsibilities for the Canadas who, in attempting to balance
the competing demands of "government," encouraged this shift.
DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The recommendation of the Select Committee that the Indian Department be abolished was, perhaps, the most visible
signal to colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t h a t the "economics" of
Canada's indigenous peoples needed to be addressed. However,
as we propose, it was the intersection of this funding issue,
along with the other "problems of government" confronting colonial administrators, that encouraged the discovery/identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site of government.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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At this juncture in time, the Canadas were undergoing significant changes. Following the American Revolution, "thousands of Loyalists poured into the Maritimes, sharply increasing pressures on the Aboriginal land and resource base" [Royal
Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Likewise, the early 1800s witnessed
the influx of immigrants from Britain, Ireland, and Scotland as
the British government and charitable organizations provided
generous aid to would-be settlers [Francis et al., 1988, p. 215].
As the Colonial Magazine [1840, p. 305] noted, in Upper Canada
"during a period of thirteen years from 1823 to 1836, the increase of population was 200,000 alone, viz. from 150,000 to
350,000." This influx of immigrants radically changed the relative numbers of settlers vis-a-vis indigenous peoples. By 1812,
the nonaboriginal population in Upper Canada outnumbered
the aboriginal population by 10:1, a ratio that increased further
in the subsequent decades [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. In
turn, the activities of the settlers created problems of government for colonial administrators.
The increase in immigration led to increased pressure for
land. In the Maritimes, "the landless new immigrants pursued
agriculture and the export of timber, and although parcels of
land had been set aside for the Indian peoples of the region,
squatting and other incursions on the Aboriginal land base inevitably occurred" [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Changing
economic activities, from the fur trade to agriculture, led to
increasing incompatible pursuits of settlers and indigenous
peoples, who were being marginalized from the development of
agriculture [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 7]. As wheat farming
a n d t i m b e r b e c a m e the b a c k b o n e of the Upper C a n a d i a n
economy during the 1815-1860 period [Francis et al., 1988, p.
223], increased calls came for the discouragement of nomadic
lifestyles and the containment of indigenous peoples on specific
tracts of land.
As Canada's population and economic activity were expanding rapidly during this period, Britain was becoming increasingly reluctant to bear the costs [cf. Cook and McNaught,
1963, p. 316]. Thus colonial officials were faced with the problem of reconciling three interrelated but potentially conflicting
policy objectives. First was the need for greater fiscal responsibility. Second was the related issue of the need to control and
contain indigenous peoples and to prevent their interference
with settlement activities. Indigenous peoples were, by the
terms of the Royal Proclamation, assuming rights of occupancy
on land that colonial officials wished to sell to settlers [Royal
Published by eGrove, 1999
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Commission, 1996]. Abolishing the Indian Department in the
n a m e of cost cutting, however, would be contrary to the increased containment of indigenous peoples. The third objective
was in response to reformist sentiments of the day, from a
multitude of sources, that emphasized the need to "protect and
civilize" indigenous peoples.
Protestant sects which were in the throes of evangelical
m o v e m e n t s stressed t h e n e e d to C h r i s t i a n i z e i n d i g e n o u s
peoples [Milloy, 1983, p. 56; Tobias, 1983, p. 40]:
Many of these sects established missions among the
Indians, similar to those the Jesuits and other Catholic
orders had been carrying on for generations. Such Missions were intended not only to teach the Indian a new
religion, but also to encourage him to adopt European
or American values [Tobias, 1983, p. 41].
In Britain, the Humanitarians argued for the protection and
civilization of the Indian as did romantic writers on both sides
of the Atlantic [Tobias, 1983, p. 41]. These sentiments tempered
the economic solutions being contemplated by colonial administrators. As we argue below, it was by attempting to reconcile
these diverse objectives that indigenous peoples came to be
identified as a site for governance.
In responding to the specific recommendations of the Select Committee and these more general problems of government, Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated
that the recommendation to eliminate the distribution of presents was inappropriate at the current time (1835):
I feel bound, after m u c h consideration, to express my
opinion, that the time has not yet arrived at which it
would be possible, consistently with good faith, altogether to discontinue the annual presents to the Indians [RAIC, 1844, p. 9].
The rationale for this opinion was the belief that such a decision would be "impolitic" and that elimination of presents
would hinder efforts to "civilize" indigenous peoples (i.e., would
be contrary to other government objectives). However, the annual distribution of presents could be modified to help accomplish this goal with the aim of eventually "diminishing their
amount, with a view to the ultimate abrogation of the existing
custom" [RAIC, 1844, p. 9]. Toward this end, Glenelg directed
the governors of the Canadian colonies to examine ways of
modifying the type of presents distributed with the aim of encouraging both "civilization" and self-sufficiency:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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Looking, however, to the moral and religious improvement of the Indians, and their instruction in the arts of
civilized life, as the principal object to be kept in view
in our intercourse with these tribes, I a m anxious that
your enquiries should be specifically directed to the
practicability of effecting a commutation of the presents for some object of permanent benefit to the parties now receiving them.
Although Glenelg did not specifically mention the objective of
controlling/containing i n d i g e n o u s peoples, the m a n n e r in
which the distribution of presents was subsequently modified
had this effect [Neu, 1997].
The solution to the dilemmas of government proposed by
Glenelg articulated a changed view of indigenous peoples. By
voicing the sentiment that the type of presents distributed could
be manipulated to encourage the "civilization" of indigenous
peoples, while at the same time satisfying the demands of settlers that indigenous peoples be contained, Lord Glenelg simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a population to be
governed and proposed the appropriate technology for government funding relations. Although isolated attempts at governance via the manipulation of presents had occurred prior to this
[cf. Neu, 1997, p. 22], Glenelg's statement defined and fores h a d o w e d B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t policy t o w a r d i n d i g e n o u s
peoples for the next 20 years.
It is important to note that the proposed solution indirectly
addressed the three competing dilemmas of government. The
specific costs associated with the Indian Department would be
reduced over time and, if successful, indigenous peoples would
both be contained and civilized. Furthermore, over the longer
term, this strategy of containment would make it easier for
colonial officials to buy and resell the land previously occupied
by indigenous peoples since this land was n o longer central to
their subsistence. Thus, the proposed solution partially reconciled the competing demands facing officials at this juncture.
Throughout the chain of events leading to the discovery/
identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site for governance, accounting techniques were salient. Accounting techniques were implicated in the Select Committee process and in
the ultimate recommendation that the Indian Department be
abolished. Glenelg's solution also proposed the manipulation of
funding relations as a method of reconciling the competing
policy objectives. As we will see in the next section, accounting
techniques also assisted in the translation of this generalized
Published by eGrove, 1999
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plan into practice. Throughout this chain of events, accounting
techniques and numbers appear to have functioned as an "ideological circle" [Smith, 1990] in that accounting calculations
both framed the problem and suggested a potential solution
that was consistent with the original framing [cf. Neu and Taylor, 1996, p. 452].
To state that accounting was salient to the process of discovering indigenous peoples as a potential site of governance is
neither to suggest that discovery occurred at a single m o m e n t
in time [cf. Foucault, 1984, p. 80] nor to assert a form of accounting-centrism whereby it is presumed that accounting is
unilaterally responsible for this shift. The preceding analysis
highlighted the idiosyncratic chain of events and circumstances
which encouraged Glenelg's articulation. Undoubtedly Glenelg's
construction of indigenous peoples as a potentially governable
population echoed and harmonized [cf. Lehman and Tinker,
1987, p. 509] with other dominant constructions of the times
[cf. Royal Commission, 1996] and thus should be viewed as, in
part, an explicit (albeit "official") statement of the Zeitgeist of
the times. However this being said, it seems safe to assert that it
was d u r i n g this general j u n c t u r e in time t h a t indigenous
peoples came to be viewed as a potentially governable population. As the preceding analysis documents, accounting was intertwined with this chain of events and, thus, salient to the
discovery.
IMPOSING GOVERNMENTALITY
While Lord Glenelg's s t a t e m e n t s identified indigenous
peoples as a potential site for governance, other government
bureaucrats soon realized that to govern a population, one had
to first "know" that population. Said [1979, p. 36] nicely captured this dialectic between knowledge and colonial government when he noted that:
Knowledge of subject races . . . is what makes their
m a n a g e m e n t easy and profitable; knowledge gives
power, more power requires more knowledge, and so
on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.
Said's comments point to the ways in which knowledge of indigenous peoples is a prerequisite for effective and efficient
colonial government.
Apparently one of the first steps in obtaining the knowledge
necessary for effective government of indigenous peoples was
to request a census of indigenous peoples:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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In the spring of 1837, the Lords of the Treasury, with
the view to enable His Majesty's Government to determine what ulterior arrangements it might be expedient
to adopt for the purpose of encouraging the Indians to
a d o p t agricultural p u r s u i t s , and acquire h a b i t s of
settled industry . . . issued the following set of queries,
which were transmitted to the Governor of either Province, and answered in considerable detail [RAIC, 1844,
p. 11].
1st. The n u m b e r of tribes and of Indians resident
within the British Territory
2nd. The pursuits of each tribe, with the n u m b e r of
fixed locations occupied by the Indians
3rd. The situation of the locations of the settled parties
or of hunting grounds occupied by the other Indians
4th. The extent of lands set apart at the different locations, for the use of the Indians, or of the hunting
ranges
5th. The persons employed in the superintendence of
the settled Indians, or of the other Tribes, with the
designations and salaries, and a summary of the duties
they have to perform
6th. The n u m b e r and description of the Clergy or
teachers attached to each tribe or party
7th. Whether the expenses of the tribe or party are
defrayed by the Parliamentary grant or from the land
payments, out of the Territorial Revenue of the Crown.
As the above questions indicate, this census sought to represent
the population of indigenous peoples with an emphasis on how
large the population was, where they resided, how they lived,
and, perhaps most importantly, how expensive they were to the
Crown.
This usage of a census was the first systematic attempt to
gather information on indigenous peoples; however, this technique had been used previously in Britain. The period 18011831 marked the introduction of the population census in Britain [Lawton, 1978, p. 12]. Cullen [1975, p. 13] argued that the
introduction of a population census was intended to provide
rhetorical support for Britain's military endeavors:
More accurate information would enable the government to form more effective policies, particularly with
regard to the recruitment of the armed forces. The cenPublished by eGrove, 1999
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sus . . . would show a substantial population increase,
thus demonstrating the nation's growing prosperity
and allaying domestic discontent.
In the three decades following the introduction of a population
census, this technique of government was a favored starting
point for addressing issues of the day:
The many environmental, social and economic problems of the nineteenth century — health and disease,
housing and sanitation, employment and unemployment, deprivation and poverty — gave rise to an abundance of Royal Commissions and Committees of Enquiry and local government investigations a n d
committee reports. But, in these and related matters,
the census of population must often be the starting
point of investigation [Lawton, 1978, p. 21].
The census was applied to various populations within society —
national crime statistics began to be published in 1810, education statistics in 1818, and the health of factory children in
1816 [Cullen, 1975, pp. 13-16]. In this regard, the transference
of this technique to indigenous peoples can be seen as an outgrowth of this trend within Britain itself.
The history of the population census within Britain implies
that the notion of a census was a popular solution to "problems
of government" at this juncture. Starting from its deployment
as a technique to justify the viability of the military, the census
came to be viewed as a prerequisite for other government action. In terms of indigenous peoples, this was also the case. The
1844 Royal Commission Report on the Affairs of the Indians in
Canada contains the results of the 1837 census of indigenous
peoples and frames the recommendations in light of the census
results. This [ac]counting of indigenous peoples, we propose,
can be read as an attempt to produce a m a p of the indigenous
population, to generate a certain type of knowledge which allowed Britain to govern indigenous peoples effectively [Said,
1979, p. 36]. Although this form of accounting differs from the
type of accounts generated by commercial enterprises, the function is similar to gather and represent information at a pointin-time in order to exercise control (whether we refer to this
control as governmentality or stewardship). Interestingly, the
usage of techniques of census on indigenous peoples presupposes a subject population and assumes a paternal relationship
whereby the colonial government has the right to attempt to
govern indigenous peoples. As mentioned previously, this reprehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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sents a change from the nation-to-nation relationship enunciated in the 1763 Royal Proclamation.
While the transfer of the [ac] counting techniques of census
to indigenous peoples can be traced to techniques of government used in Britain at this juncture, we are unsure whether
the suggestion by Lord Glenelg to use funding relations as a
technology of government was a transfer of an existing technique or a "made in the colonies" solution. Issues of lineage
aside, following Lord Glenelg's letter to the governors in 1835,
accounting techniques of governance were applied to the indigenous population.
The areas of agriculture and education were the initial sites
in which the Crown attempted to change behavior via the manipulation of presents. For example, in an 1836 letter to the
governors of the Canadian provinces, Lord Glenelg [1836, p.
433] recommended shifting a portion of the funds spent on
presents to the area of education:
[His Majesty's Government] are prepared, should you
think such a measure practicable, and if the consent of
the Indians can be obtained to it, to sanction the application of at least a portion of the sums now expended
in the purchase of stores and presents, to the erection
of school houses, the purchase of elementary books,
and the payment of resident schoolmasters, for the
benefit of Indian tribes.
Likewise in a subsequent letter, Lord Glenelg suggested that
with the view of encouraging indigenous peoples to abandon a
wandering lifestyle that agricultural implements be substituted
for other presents "giving [indigenous peoples] agricultural
implements, but no other Description of Presents" [Glenelg,
1838, p. 235]. The policy direction provided by Glenelg was
consistent with the interests of settlers that indigenous peoples
be "encouraged" to abandon traditional pursuits which conflicted with settlement.
These policies regarding the manipulation of presents were
reiterated and reaffirmed in the 1844 Report on the Affairs of
the I n d i a n s in C a n a d a . This R e p o r t r e c o m m e n d e d major
changes to the Indian Department and an increased emphasis
on agriculture and education, with the manipulation of presents being the primary method of encouraging these changes.
Subsequent to this Report, the annual issue of gunpowder was
withheld:
On bythe
30th 1999
of January, 1849, the Earl of Elgin rePublished
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ported the arrangement made by Lord Metcalf in 1845,
with most of the settled Tribes, where by the annual
issue of gunpowder was withheld on the understanding
that the sum saved would be applied to promoting education among them [Report of the Special Commissioners, 1858, p. 2].
Such manipulations continued until 1858 when the British Parliament recommended that the annual issue of presents be discontinued. These examples strongly suggest that presents dist r i b u t e d to i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s w e r e u s e d as a specific
technology of government in an attempt to encourage certain
types of behavior, notably the pursuit of a "settled" and "civil i z e d " lifestyle. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , F o u c a u l t ' s d i s c u s s i o n of
governmentality seems to envision this very type of manipulation in that he states that it is often "customs" (i.e., a wandering
lifestyle) that techniques of government are directed at changing. "The things with which government is to be concerned with
are in fact men, but men in their relation to that other kind of
thing, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking" [Foucault,
1991, p. 93]. It was through the usage of accounting techniques
of governance that Britain attempted to satisfy the competing
demands for the minimization of costs, the civilization and protection of indigenous peoples, and their control and containment on segregated reserves.
Although the preceding analysis has focused on the use of
accounting techniques to accomplish governmentality, other
techniques of government were also deployed. For example, the
appointment of Indian agents responsible for the affairs of specific tribes was used to implement government policy, helping
to accomplish the goals of containment and civilization [Milloy,
1983, pp. 59-60]. Likewise the establishment of the first residential schools during the 1840s, with their explicit objectives
of "weaning [indigenous peoples] from the habits and feelings
of their ancestors..." [Grant, 1996, p. 59] and the increasing
involvement of missionaries in the administration of the affairs
of indigenous peoples [cf. York and Pindera, 1992, pp. 88-89],
complemented the aforementioned accounting techniques in
achieving governmentality. Consistent with Miller and Rose's
[1990, p. 97] observation that governmentality is accomplished
via heterogenous technologies operating in heterogenous sites,
governmentality was accomplished in the case of indigenous
peoples by a variety of mechanisms, including accounting, operating in different locales.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/5
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CONCLUSION
Explanations of the success of British imperialism during
the 1800s often emphasize the importance of technology [cf.
Headrick, 1981, 1988], political values [cf. Lloyd, 1996] or econ o m i c motivations [cf. Hobson, 1902]. The c u r r e n t study
supplements these explanations by documenting the role(s)
played by accounting techniques within the military machinery
of empire. Our thesis is that accounting techniques, at least in
the early 1800s, were firmly embedded within the military machinery of empire and served to frame the military decisions of
the day. Drawing upon the theoretical work of Foucault [1991],
Miller and Rose [1990, 1995], Said [1979, 1993], and others, we
theorize accounting as a technology of government that helped
to facilitate action at a distance. More specifically, we propose
that accounting contributed to British imperialism by returning
to the centers of calculation information that rendered distant
territories and their occupants governable.
In the context of Canada's indigenous peoples, the current
study sought to analyze the moment(s) at which indigenous
peoples came to be viewed as a governable population rather
than as a distinct nation and when/how accounting techniques
came to penetrate this domain. Our analysis suggested that the
c o m p e t i n g p r e s s u r e s of f i n a n c i a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n in t h e
Canadas, the demands from settlers that indigenous peoples be
contained, and reformist discourses emphasizing the importance of civilizing indigenous peoples encouraged the identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population. In
response to these pressures, Lord Glenelg proposed the manipulation of funding relations (i.e., the annual distribution of
presents) as a method of accomplishing these disparate objectives. This public statement by the Secretary of the Colonies
simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a governable
population and proposed the technology of government that
would encourage the desired behavior. Subsequent to this pronouncement, the [ac]counting techniques of census were transferred from the imperial center in the attempt to come to
"know" indigenous peoples, and funding relations were systematically manipulated in the attempt to satisfy the competing
policy objectives. Thus, as a consequence of this chain of
events, we see in the 1830-1858 period the slippage from a
nation-to-nation relationship between Britain and indigenous
peoples to a paternal relationship. Intertwined with this slippage was the identification/construction of indigenous peoples
Published by eGrove, 1999
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as a governable population, and the penetration of this domain
by accounting (and other techniques) functioning as technologies of government.
The study resonates with the current day in that it makes
visible the lineage of p a t e r n a l views regarding indigenous
peoples and the persistence of accounting technologies of governance within this domain. However, while the current study
is suggestive of parallels between the 1830s and the 1990s, more
research is needed to understand how accounting techniques of
governance have changed/evolved over this time period. Foucault [1991] and Said [1979], for example, implied that techniques of regulation/government may become more precise
over time as the knowledge gained from previous attempts
helps to refine the technologies. Yet Miller and Rose [1990, p.
10] provided the caution that "whilst 'governmentality' is eternally optimistic, 'government' is a congenitally failing operation." Consequently, more research is needed to understand
how the accounting technologies of government directed at indigenous peoples have changed since the 1830s, whether these
technologies have become more precise in terms of the effects
they are intended to induce, and the m a n n e r in which these
technologies are resisted by those targeted by them.
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